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Commentary
Timothy W. Cogley
technical introduction to their work and also
describes a pair of thoughtful and well-designed
examples that illustrate how uncertainty about
the monetary transmission mechanism influences
optimal policy. One lesson that emerges from their
examples is that the benefits of learning are often
substantial but that the gains from deliberate
experimentation are slight. In their parlance, an
“adaptive optimal policy” is almost as good as
the fully optimal Bayesian policy.
ATTITUDES ABOUT POLICY
EXPERIMENTATION
My comment focuses on the role of experi-
mentation. A natural way to address parameter
and/or model uncertainty is to cast an optimal
policy problem as a Bayesian decision problem.
The decisionmaker’s posterior distribution over
unknown parameters and/or model probabilities
becomes part of the state vector, and Bayes’s law
becomes part of the transition equation. Because
Bayes’s law is nonlinear, this breaks certainty
equivalence,2 making the decision rule nonlinear.
A Bellman equation instructs the decisionmaker
to vary the policy instrument in order to generate
information about unknown parameters and
model probabilities. Hence, policymakers have an
W
illiam Poole has made a number
of fundamental contributions to
the theory and practice of mone-
tary policy during his long and
productive career. Among other things, Poole has
long emphasized the importance of uncertainty
in shaping monetary policy. Uncertainty takes
many forms. The central bank must act in antic-
ipation of future conditions, which are currently
unknown. Because economists have not formed
a consensus about the best way to model the
monetary transmission mechanism, policymakers
must also contemplate alternative theories with
distinctive operating characteristics. Finally, even
economists who agree on a modeling strategy
sometimes disagree about the values of key
parameters. Thus, central bankers must also
confront parameter uncertainty within macro-
economic models.
Addressing all these sources of uncertainty
is a tall order, but economists have made consid-
erable progress. Lars Svensson and Noah Williams
are in the vanguard. In a series of important
papers, they adapt and extend Markov jump-
linear-quadratic (MJLQ) control algorithms so
that they are suitable for application to monetary
policy.1 Among other things, they extend MJLQ
algorithms to handle forward-looking models
and show how to design optimal policies under
commitment. Their contribution to this volume
(Svensson and Williams, 2008) provides a concise
1 See Svensson and Williams (2007a,b and 2008).
2 Certainty equivalence would hold if the central bank’s objective
function were quadratic and the transition equation were linear.
The presence of Bayes’s law as a component of the transition equa-
tion makes it nonlinear and hence breaks certainty equivalence.
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in the future. Although experimentation causes
near-term outcomes to deteriorate, it speeds learn-
ing and improves outcomes in the longer run.
Whether the decisionmaker should experiment
a little or a lot is unclear, but it is clear that a
Bayesian policy should include some deliberate
experimentation.
Yet there is much aversion to deliberate
experimentation among macroeconomists and
policymakers. For instance, Robert Lucas (1981,
p. 288) writes,
Social experiments on the grand scale may be
instructive and admirable, but they are best
admired at a distance. The idea...must be to
gain some confidence that the component parts
of the program are in some sense reliable prior
to running it at the expense of our neighbors.
Alan Blinder (1998, p. 11) concurs, asserting
that
while there are some fairly sophisticated tech-
niques for dealing with parameter uncertainty
in optimal control models with learning, those
methods have not attracted the attention of...
policymakers. There is a good reason for this
inattention, I think: You don’t conduct policy
experiments on a real economy solely to
sharpen your econometric estimates.
One way to make sense of these conflicting
attitudes is to invoke Milton Friedman’s precept
that the best should not be an enemy of the good.
According to Svensson and Williams, a good base-
line policy involves learning but not deliberate
experimentation. In principle, optimal experi-
ments can improve on this baseline policy, but
optimal experiments are hard to design because
the policymaker’s Bellman equation is difficult
to solve, the chief obstacle being the curse of
dimensionality. Because Bellman equations for
policy-relevant models are hard to solve, actual
policy experiments are unlikely to be optimal.
And although optimal experiments are guaranteed
to be no worse than the “learn but don’t experi-
ment” benchmark, suboptimal experiments are
not. Indeed, they might be much worse. Perhaps
this is what Lucas had in mind when he depre-
cated “grand” policy experiments.3
Svensson and Williams have made substan-
tial progress improving algorithms for solving
Bayesian optimal policy problems. Without dis-
paraging this contribution, my sense is that the
curse of dimensionality will continue to be a sig-
nificant barrier in practice. In view of this, their
finding that the maximum benefit of experimen-
tation is slight takes on greater importance, for it
strengthens the case in favor of adaptive optimal
policies. Their findings are example specific, but
they are consistent with other examples in the
literature. More examples would help clinch the
argument.
ANOTHER EXAMPLE
Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007; CCS)
examine a central bank’s incentive to experiment
in the context of two models of the Phillips curve.
One model follows Samuelson and Solow (1960)
and assumes an exploitable inflation-unemploy-
ment tradeoff. The other is inspired by Lucas
(1972 and 1973) and Sargent (1973) and repre-
sents a rational expectations version of the natu-
ral rate hypothesis. Based on data through the
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3 One of the initial objectives of Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007)
was to assess whether the Great Inflation could be interpreted as
an optimal experiment. We found that it could not. At least in our
model, optimal experiments did not generate a decade-long surge
in inflation. On the contrary, they generated small, cyclically
opportunistic perturbations of inflation relative to an adaptive,
non-experimental policy. Whether the Great Inflation was initiated
by a suboptimal policy experiment remains an open question.ditioned on t–1 information, and ʷit, i = 1,…,4,
are standard normal innovations.
CCS assume that one of these specifications
is true but that the central bank does not know
which one. As in Svensson and Williams (2008),
the central bank formulates policy by solving
Bayesian and adaptive optimal control problems.
The key unknown parameter is the posterior
probability, ʱ, on the Samuelson and Solow
model. This probability is updated every period
in accordance with Bayes’s law. The cental bank
minimizes a discounted quadratic loss function
subject to the “natural” transition equations for
the two models and also a transition equation for
ʱ. The state vector consists of lagged unemploy-
ment and the posterior model probability, ʱ, and
the control variable is programmed inflation.
For the adaptive policy, the central bank
updates ʱ every period, but then treats the current
estimate as if it would remain constant forever.
Thus, for adaptive control problem, the ʱ transi-
tion equation is
Because the other transition equations are also
linear and the loss function is quadratic, it follows
αα tj t j + =∀ ≥ 0.
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Figure 1
Two Decision Rulesthat certainty equivalence holds and that the
policy rule is linear. The thin gray lines in Figure 1
illustrate how programmed inflation is set as a
function of ʱ and lagged unemployment. Each
panel refers to a different value for ʱ, model uncer-
tainty being most pronounced for ʱ ￿ 0.4. Lagged
unemployment is shown on the x-axis in each
panel, and programmed inflation is on the y-axis.
Except when ʱ is close to zero (the central bank
puts high probability on the Lucas and Sargent
model), programmed inflation is countercyclical.
For the Bayesian optimal policy, the central
bank recognizes that actions taken today influence
future beliefs about the two models. Hence the
ʱ-transition equation is governed by Bayes’s law,
where st represents the “natural” state variables
for the two models. The thick blue lines in
Figure 1 depict the Bayesian decision rule. For
the most part, they differ only slightly from the
adaptive optimal policy. The chief difference is
αα tt t Bs = () −1,,
that the Bayesian policy is cyclically opportunis-
tic when there is a lot of model uncertainty. When
ʱ ￿ 0.4, the Bayesian policy calls for higher
(lower) programmed inflation relative to the
adaptive optimal policy when unemployment is
high (low). In other words, a recession is the best
time to experiment with Keynesian stimulus
and a boom is the best time to experiment with
disinflation.
Because the two policy functions are so alike,
it is not surprising that the benefits of deliberate
experimentation are small. Figure 2 portrays the
value functions associated with the adaptive and
Bayesian policy rules. Because the adaptive policy
is not optimal, it follows that VB￿s,ʱ￿ ≥ VB￿s;ʱ￿,
with the discrepancy measuring the benefits of
deliberate experimentation. However, the differ-
ences are so slight that they cannot be detected
in the figure. Thus, the results of CCS agree with
those of Svensson and Williams.4
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4 Other aspects of monetary policy experimentation are examined
by Wieland (2000a,b) and Beck and Wieland (2002).WHY THE BENEFITS OF
EXPERIMENTATION ARE SLIGHT
Deliberate experiments are substitutes for
natural experiments. Hence, the incidence of
natural experiments arising from exogenous
shocks influences the value of intentional exper-
iments. In the CCS example, one reason why the
adaptive policy well approximates the Bayesian
policy is that enough natural experimentation
occurs for the central bank eventually to learn the
true model under the adaptive policy.5 Deliberate
experimentation would speed learning, but not
alter the limit point. In other models, such as Kasa
(1999), there isn’t enough natural experimentation
to learn the truth in the absence of intentional
experimentation. In those environments, delib-
erate experimentation would alter not only the
transition path but also the limit point of the learn-
ing process. Presumably that would enhance the
value of deliberate experimentation, for in that
case the central bank would collect dividends on
experimentation forever.
Another reason why the benefits of experimen-
tation are small is that Bayesian updating makes
posterior model probabilities a martingale (Doob,
1948), implying Et￿ʱt+j￿ = ʱt. Thus, the adaptive
transition equation well approximates the center
of the Bayesian predictive density for ʱt. The
adaptive model poorly approximates its tails,
however, because it disregards uncertainty about
future model probabilities. Nevertheless, when
precautionary motives are weak, decisions depend
mostly on the mean, and errors in approximating
the tails don’t matter much. In these examples,
the central bank’s loss function is quadratic, so
precautionary motives do not enter through pref-
erences. Precautionary behavior comes in only
because of nonlinearity in the transition equation.
Accordingly, motives for experimentation might
be strengthened by altering the central bank’s
objective function.
In principle, one way to reinforce precaution-
ary motives is by introducing a concern for robust-
ness. Building on work by Hansen and Sargent
(2007), Cogley et al. (2008) replace the expecta-
tions operators that appear in a Bayesian value
function with a pair of risk-sensitivity operators.
One risk-sensitivity operator guards against mis-
specification of each of the submodels, and the
other guards against misspecification of the central
bank’s prior. The two risk-sensitivity operators
can be interpreted as ways of seeking robustness
with respect to forward- and backward-looking
features of the model, respectively. Applying
these operators to the Phillips curve models exam-
ined in CCS, Cogley et al. find that the forward-
looking risk-sensitivity operator strengthens
experimental motives, whereas the backward-
looking operator mutes them. The combined effect
is ambiguous and depends on the relative weight
placed on the two operators.
CONCLUSION
Designing an optimal policy is substantially
more complex when experimental motives are
active. That easy-to-compute, nonexperimental
policies well approximate hard-to-compute, fully-
optimal policies is an important result. If this con-
clusion holds up to further scrutiny, the analysis
of monetary policy under model uncertainty will
be greatly simplified. In this instance, it seems
that “the good” is an excellent substitute for “the
best.”
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